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Abstract: The regulation of on-field competition by officials is an important aspect of the 
management of sport. Increasingly, sports are providing technological support for officials to 
aid their decision making. In this paper, the authors analyse the impact of such an innovation 
by exploring the impact of the introduction and subsequent extended role of the television 
match official on the award of sanctionable offences of players in matches played in the group 
stages of the European Rugby Cup (ERC) and European Rugby Champions Cup (ERCC) over 
15 seasons from 2000/01 to 2015/16. Rugby Union is an important sport to reflect upon 
because of the central role that the referee plays in rule interpretation and game management 
and the level of home advantage tends to be relatively high in the sport. Indeed, 65% of all 
matches in the sample analysed resulted in home wins. Results suggest that crowd effects and 
referee experience influence referee decisions, but the effects vary depending on the type of 
incident being considered. The main finding and contribution of the paper is that the 
introduction of the television match official has influenced the incidence of sanctions issued 
to both teams. However, the increase in the number of yellow cards awarded to away teams 
implies that home bias has increased since the introduction of the television match official.  
This suggests that referees may have been consciously or unconsciously seeking to avoid 
contributing to home bias before the introduction of a further official who is remote from the 
effects of the crowd. Recognising that such an adjustment takes place according to the 
circumstances is important information for the training of officials; particularly as a television 
match official may not be present in all games that they will referee. 
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1. Introduction 
Lack of bias in sporting competition has always been viewed as essential to its 
sustainability. This is, whether residing in the expression of necessary ethical and moral 
dimensions of fair play in the developments of modern sport in England (Renson, 2009), 
aspirations of which carry through to current codes of ethics (Council of Europe, 2010), or for 
more commercial needs such as the initial need to facilitate gambling as sports developed 
(Renson, 2009) and subsequent arguments for the need to regulate competitive balance in sports 
leagues to sustain their long-term economic prospects (Downward, Dawson & Dejonghe, 
2009). It is upon the latter arguments that recent policies such as UEFA’s Financial Fair Play 
have their foundation (Peeters & Szymanski, 2014). Officiating sports contests in a fair way 
has always been an essential part of these developments stemming from an initial need to 
ensure adherence to newly codified rules and laws of games, having authority to arbitrate on 
disputed actions and, importantly, to see that justice is done (Rains, 1984). However, the 
importance of such a role for officials has heightened with the growth in the commercialisation 
of sport (Webb, 2017) and this raises challenge for the management of sports competition.  
Consequently, home advantage is a commonly observed feature in many team sports. 
Home advantage reflects a bias such that, in a balanced schedule of home and away fixtures, 
home teams win more than 50% of games. Along with the motivational influence of the crowd 
upon players, familiarity with the venue, travel factors – such as distance and duration which can 
fatigue away opposition- and rule factors such as who bats first have been identified as sources 
of bias. However, match officials are also identified as a key source of the mediation of home 
bias through the crowd as the latter can influence the subjective judgements of the former 
(Carron, Loughhead, & Bray, 2005; Courneya & Carron, 1992; Pollard, 2008). It is important to 
recognise, therefore, that this bias is not assumed to be generally associated with officiating 
malfeasance; rather, is a statistical outcome reflecting the context of decision-making influencing 
officials’ decisions and match outcomes. For example, Rodenberg and Lim (2009) found only 
one case of what they describe as retribution decision making in NBA playoff games.  
Nonetheless, sports are now increasingly introducing technology to aid decision making, 
of which the television match official is one, to help to provide a less contextually influenced 
decision. As Wright (2014) and Kendall and Lenten (2017) note, however, unexpected 
consequences can follow with organisational and rule changes in sport. Effective management 
and delivery of sports competitions thus requires monitoring for unintended consequences and 
realigning policy to account for it.  
Consequently, we consider whether there were unintended consequences associated with 
the introduction, and subsequent extended role, of the television match official in connection to 
the incidence of sanctionable offences in the group stages of the European Rugby Cup (ERC) 
and European Rugby Champions Cup (ERCC)1 over 15 seasons from 2000/01 to 2015/16. It is 
the first study to examine the impact of technological monitoring of officials in rugby. The 
contribution and focus are upon the assumed potential of a television match official to reduce 
home bias through increased monitoring as suggested might be the case with their introduction 
by Downward and Jones (2007). Rugby union provides an important context to explore this issue 
because of the relatively high level of home advantage (65% in our sample), the greater influence 
of the referee compared with many other team sports (Page & Page, 2010), and the fact that rugby 
union has a long history of the use of a television match official.  
2. Bias and official behaviour 
2.1 Theoretical insight 
Officials in sports contexts can be understood theoretically and structurally as acting as 
                                              
1 The ERC/ERCC is similar to football’s UEFA Champions League, albeit with participating 
teams drawn from just six countries – England, France, Ireland, Italy, Scotland and Wales. 
an agent in a Principal-Agent relationship, in which the principal is the sport’s organisational 
body. In a general setting, the Principal-Agent relationship involves the delegation of a task 
from a principal to an agent in the context of imperfect or asymmetric information such that 
the agent is imperfectly monitored and has the discretion to act in their own interests rather 
than the principal’s (Laffont & Martimort, 2002). In sport, the sports organisation seeks to 
ensure that the laws of the game are adhered to so that fair competition takes place.  
However, it is the officials acting at the tournament that actually make the decisions 
about the governance of the contest. As Collins (2010) argues, during games it has been widely 
accepted in sport that the official’s decision is final. Such (ontological) authority has 
traditionally been supported by the notion that the official has the (epistemological) privilege 
of having both a clearer view of the game through being on the field of play and, moreover, 
has the skills required to officiate through for example, being a prior participant in the sport, 
having received relevant training etc.  
This delegation of authority to sports officials is, to an extent, distinct from the more 
general principal-agent context in which the former needs to develop incentives to ensure that 
the Agent acts as the Principal intends. In the context of personnel economics, therefore, a large 
literature has therefore developed drawing on (Lazear, 1995) in which a core recommendation 
is to link pay to performance. Alternatively enhanced monitoring of the relationship can be 
employed and has been shown to improve short-run performance, or can be linked to longer 
run human resource development (Taylor & Tyler, 2012). However, increased monitoring has 
also been argued to be detrimental to delivering outcomes by increasing the stress and pressure 
to perform by agents (Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates, & Hamermesh, 2011) or by reducing their 
trust (Frey, 1993). 
In sport it is the monitoring of officials that is potentially of most relevance as 
performance related pay is largely absent, though it has been shown that a movement from 
short-term to salaried contracts improved official decision making (Bryson, Buraimo, & 
Simmons, 2011). However, there is no strong evidence on the effectiveness of monitoring of 
officials by sports organisations, though as noted above, scrutiny and monitoring of officials is 
not just undertaken by sports organisations but also by crowds, which can influence officials  
(Mascarenhas, Collins, & Mortimer, 2005).  
Theoretically, an economic interpretation of this process by which crowds influence 
officials’ decisions could be that preferences are endogenous and influenced by social 
contextual behaviour (Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, & Prendergast, 2005). In psychological 
terms this might be because crowd noise acts as a cue to the interpretation of a situation, 
involving players or outcomes on the field. As these monitoring cues are likely to be biased, 
then the official’s decisions may become shaped to reflect this prevailing sentiment (Unkelbach 
& Memmert, 2010). As sports require rapid and time constrained decisions in a context that 
lacks opportunity for complex evaluations then it is likely that officials will focus on salient 
cues such as crowd noise (Nevill, Balmer, & Williams, 2002; Page & Page, 2010).  
Implicit preferences might also underpin favouritism, though the bias may be 
unconscious. Insights into favouritism within a Principal-Agency framework are provided by 
Prendergast and Topel (1996). They find that subjectivity may lead to supervisors rewarding 
(punishing) preferred (less preferred) workers. Social identity, such as shared national identity 
and beliefs (based on prior experience, for example), have been recognised as key sources of 
favouritism. In sport, such preferences might reflect the incidence of greater contact between 
particular teams and officials (Hlasny & Kolaric, 2017). Moreover, in this context, clearly 
national, or sporting allegiance could potentially influence officials (Dawson & Dobson, 2010). 
However, it is also argued that decision making can be affected by the decision-maker’s level 
of experience (Garside, Grout, & Zalewska, 2013). 
The key focus of attention in this paper is upon the introduction and enhanced role of the 
television match official as a monitoring device. As noted above, in general it is unclear what the 
outcome of increased monitoring might be. In sports, Collins (2010) notes that the introduction 
of additional monitoring to a traditional structure of decision making can:  
degrade the epistemological privilege of the umpire and referee…the 
epistemological privilege has moved to the crowd or the remote television viewer. 
This often means that there is disharmony between the ontological authority and 
the epistemological privilege leading to loss of credibility of the match official 
(Collins, 2010 p. 136) 
Consequently, it is important to examine what the implications of these changes might be for 
officials’ decisions. As noted below, empirical insight into the role of additional monitoring is 
relatively limited.  
2.2 Empirical insight 
  Since the earlier work of Courneya and Carron (1992), Dohmen and Sauermann (2016) 
cite a well-developed literature which addresses the related concepts of home advantage and 
referee bias in sports. Nevill and Holder (1999) conclude that the weight of evidence indicates 
that the crowd is the main source of home advantage and that this is largely due to the effects of 
the crowd on referees. Consequently in an experimental study Nevill, Hemingway, Greaves, 
Dallaway, and Devonport (2017) show that compared to football referees with no fans present in 
a room when reviewing actual referee decisions of the 2016 Champion’s league final, football 
referees disagreed with the actual referee less when fans were present. However, the 
disagreements favoured the team whose fans were present. Moreover, Trandel and Maxcy (2011) 
attribute differences in home advantage between US sports in part to the fact that crowds sit 
closer to players and officials in arena sports such as basketball and ice hockey than they do in 
(primarily) outdoor sports. 
A number of forms of referee bias are explored in the literature. Nevill et al., (2002) find 
that in an English Premier League match between Liverpool (home) and Leicester City (away) 
from the 1998/1999 season, referees are likely to treat the tackles made by the home team more 
leniently when exposed to the effects of crowd noise. Sutter and Kocher (2004) found that 
referees added more extra time and awarded more penalties in favour of the home team, when it 
was behind, in the German Bundesliga and the Spanish Primera Liga. Garicano et al., (2005) 
moreover report a positive relationship between crowd size and referee bias in favour of the home 
team in Spanish football through referees adding more time to games and reducing extra time in 
games when the home team is behind or in front respectively. Garicano et al., (2005) control in 
their analysis for the possession of yellow and red-cards by teams. The sanction of players 
through the awarding of cards has also, however, been researched.  
As well as awarding more penalties in favour of the home team Boyko, Boyko, and 
Boyko (2007) find that English Premier League football referees also awarded more yellow and 
red cards for the away team than the home team and argue that crowd size influences this result, 
though it varies across different referees. Studies by Buraimo, Forrest, and Simmons (2010) and 
Buraimo, Simmons, and Maciaszczyk (2012) focussing on matches in the English Premier 
League and Bundesliga, and Primera Liga in Spain and Champions League matches respectively, 
identify that the award of yellow cards and red cards, and the award of yellow cards favours the 
home team. Significantly they identify that in situations in which the pitch is surrounded by a 
running track home advantage is less. This is evidence of reduced crowd impacts on referee 
decisions.  
In contrast Reilly and Witt (2013) find that whilst there is evidence of home bias in the 
award of red cards in the English Premier League, crowd size does not influence the results.  
Likewise Dawson, Dobson, Goddard, and Wilson (2007) also analyse the English Premier 
League and identify that the away teams incur more disciplinary sanction in the form of red and 
yellow cards than home teams, controlling for their relative strength and crowd size, the latter of 
which does not influence the results. Heterogenous behaviour across referees is also identified. 
Such heterogeneity is also identified by Dawson and Dobson (2010) who examine European cup 
football matches. Specifically, referee and team nationality is important in understanding referee 
bias as well as crowd density, stadium architecture and the stage of the competition.  Dawson 
(2012) does show, however, that referee experience can ameliorate some of the bias. 
 Downward and Jones (2007), moreover, analyse data on yellow cards issued in matches 
in English football’s F.A. Cup finding that crowd size affected the degree of referee bias in favour 
of the home team. They also show that the effects are non-linear as they diminish with larger 
crowds. This is attributed to larger crowds being more balanced at neutral venues in the latter 
stages of the competition. They are also the first to suggest that consideration should be given to 
using ‘video referees’ (i.e. television match officials) deployed outside the ground, and away 
from the influence of the crowd, for crucial match-changing decisions.  
Support for the non-linear effect of crowd sizes is also provided by Pollard (1986) and 
Clarke and Norman (1995) who both show that home advantage was lower in English football 
matches between London based clubs which they attribute to attendances being more evenly 
balanced in such matches. Jones, Bray, and Bolton (2001) also report no evidence of official bias 
in English minor league cricket where average attendances are less than 50.  
Finally, focussing on the chances of winning games in the Bundesliga and Major League 
Soccer, rather than within-game decision making, it has been found that the award of yellow 
cards can influence game outcomes, and the distribution of such cards favours home teams 
(Anders & Rotthoff, 2011, 2014). 
It is notable that many of the above studies focus on football. The current study examines 
rugby and there has been less research in this context. An emergent literature does, however, 
identify the presence of home advantage in the specific context of Rugby Union. Thomas, 
Reeves, and Bell (2008) and Vaz, Carreras, and Kraak (2012) find evidence of home advantage 
in rugby’s Six Nations Championship in Europe based on matches played between 2000 and 
2007 and 2005 and 2009 respectively. Pretorius, Litvine, Nevill, and Terblanche (1999) report 
evidence of home advantage in the Currie Cup, a South African rugby competition, although 
Pretorius, Pierce, and Litvine (2000) subsequently attribute this to the effects of altitude. Gómez, 
Pollard, and Pascual (2011) suggest that the high level of home advantage observed in Spanish 
rugby reflects the continuous, aggressive and intense nature of the sport, particularly with home 
competitors.  
These studies did not focus on officials. In contrast, Page and Page (2010) found evidence 
of referee bias in Rugby Union’s southern hemisphere Super 14 and Rugby League’s Euro Super 
League. However, their study focuses on a rather unique situation where, in both competitions, 
referees officiated in matches involving teams from their own country playing a team from 
another country. It is found that shared national identity with the referee increases the likelihood 
of a win, as well as favourable within-game decisions such as the awarding of penalties and the 
award of yellow cards. It is also shown that the bias increases when scores are closest between 
competitors. 
Increased monitoring of officials has been made possible in sports by the presence of 
additional on-field officials or the use technological monitoring. As noted earlier, additional 
monitoring could have both positive and negative effects on the performance of officials. On the 
one hand the presence of a peer - physically or remotely - can induce higher performance and 
effort and reduce the effects of bias. On the other hand, the presence of assistance may result in 
over-reliance which in turn can induce greater pressure from other sources such as the crowd 
who become increasingly irritated by what they may perceive as the apparent indecisiveness of 
the officials. 
Empirical studies have tended to focus on the impact of increased capacity to monitor 
sports matches on player behaviour, however. For example, McCormick and Tollison (1984) in 
the case of North American college basketball find that an increase in the number of officials 
resulted in a significant reduction in the number of fouls called per game because of asserted 
greater competence in officiating. However, Heckelman and Yates (2003) find that following an 
increase in the number of officials in the National Hockey League, there was no reduction in the 
incidents of foul play, but an increase in the number of incidents of foul play that were observed 
and sanctioned. Finally, Dawson (2014) finds limited evidence to support the view that the 
introduction of two additional assistant referees in UEFA Champions League matches over the 
period 2008/9 to 2011/12 affected the number of fouls called, sanctionable offences observed 
and attacking play.  
A common feature of all the above studies is that they typically refer to on-field officials.  
Increasingly the use of third-party assistance has been implemented in a number of sports which 
is directly aimed at monitoring officials’ decisions and has begun to attract attention in the 
academic literature. Hamrick and Rasp (2015) report that the camera monitoring of strike calls 
in baseball led to a slight increase in the chance that a pitch was called a strike by umpires . 
Likewise, Shivakumar (2018) analyses the Decision Review System (DRS) in cricket, in which 
teams can appeal to a third umpire who has access to technological monitoring, up to two times 
per innings. It is shown that whilst the DRS system does not contribute to home bias, there has 
been an erosion of the traditional benefit of doubt given to the batsman. Finally, Mills (2017) 
investigates the impact of the development of technological monitoring of, first, the accuracy of 
ball-strike calls and, second, new ball-tracking technology, used to feedback accuracy to umpires 
after games. Improvements in accuracy are identified, with a particular effect on younger 
officials. 
To the best of our knowledge, there have been limited analyses of referee bias in the 
context of rugby in general and Rugby Union in particular. Moreover, there are no studies on the 
potential impact of technological monitoring in rugby, although it is not a new phenomenon. In 
2001/02, a television match official was introduced to ERC Rugby to help the on-field referee 
decide if the ball had been legitimately grounded for a try. The television match official’s role 
was expanded in 2013/14 to include reviews of possible foul play. In what follows, therefore, 
this paper examines for the first time both the introduction and extension of the television match 
official in rugby union to determine whether the television match official has influenced the 
incidence of disciplinary sanctions – in the form of yellow and red card offences – and in the 
awarding of penalty tries. In particular, the paper investigates the hypothesis of Downward and 
Jones (2007), and reflecting the theoretical mechanisms previously identified, that the presence 
of additional monitoring through the television match official could reduce favouritism and 
therefore bias. 
3. Data and methodology 
The dataset covers matches played in the group stages of the ERC/ERCC between 
2000/01 and 2015/16. A small number of missing values associated with attendances and referee 
experience provides a total sample size of 1,121 matches.  
As noted above, several studies of bias in football have focused on decisions on the 
additional time to be added on at the end of a match which is at the discretion of the referee 
(Garicano et al., 2005). In top level rugby matches, the referee is not the time-keeper so the scope 
to favour the home team by playing additional time is limited. Consequently, this paper follows 
the above literature that analyses the awarding of yellow cards to players for signs of possible 
referee bias. Yellow cards were introduced to the ERC at the start of the 2000/01 season.2 In 
rugby a player who is shown a yellow card is excluded from the match for a period of 10 minutes 
and cannot be replaced thus leaving the player’s team a player short for that period. The analysis 
also focuses on the award of red cards. A red card results in a player’s permanent expulsion from 
                                              
2 Sendings-off and red cards have been in operation much longer. 
the current match. In rugby, moreover, a penalty try may be awarded when the referee believes 
that foul play prevented a try from being scored. Consequently, the paper also examines if more 
penalty tries are awarded to the home team. 
The data show a higher proportion of yellow and red cards being awarded to the away 
team. Penalty tries are rare, which is perhaps not surprising as the referee must be certain that a 
try would probably have been scored in the absence of the infringement. Thus, in the 1,121 ERC 
pool stage matches in the sample, only 122 penalty tries were awarded, although nearly twice as 
many were awarded to home teams as to away teams (78 versus 44). Red cards are also rare; 16 
red cards were issued to the home team and 27 issued to the away team in the sample3. 
The key feature of this paper is the impact of the television match official on the incidence 
of yellow and red cards and the awarding of penalty tries. A preliminary analysis of the mean 
number of incidences (yellow cards, red cards and penalty tries) before and after the introduction 
of the television match official in 2001/02 and extension of their role in 2013/14 is provided in 
Table 1. There is a marginal increase in yellow cards awarded to the home team but a larger 
increase for the away team following the introduction of the television match official (to mitigate 
against possible trend effects associated with rule changes which could influence home bias, as 
previously noted, a season-based time trend is included in the conditional estimations detailed 
below). A further increase is observed for yellow cards awarded to home teams whereas there is 
a fall for away teams following the extended role of the television match official. Much smaller 
increases are associated with the awarding of penalty tries when comparing the period before the 
introduction of the television match official but larger increases following the extended role of 
the television match official. Finally, reductions in red cards are observed for both home and 
                                              
3 Full details on the distributions relating to the incidence of yellow and red cards and penalty 
tries are available from the corresponding author upon request. 
away teams following the introduction and extension of the television match official. 
Table 1 near here. 
In the empirical analysis that follows the dependent variable is constructed to combine 
both yellow and red cards and penalty tries as well as for these three types of incident separately. 
Following Dawson et al., (2007) the composite measure weights a red card as double that of a 
yellow card. For the purpose of this study penalty tries are given the same weight as a yellow 
card. This is consistent with the view, often reported in the media, that teams concede 7-8 points 
on average during the period of a yellow card; a penalty try is worth five points and the 
subsequent conversion, worth 2 additional points, is almost always scored as the kick is taken 
from in front of the posts (Petty, 2014).  
One approach to modelling incidents of yellow card offences is to use count data 
regression models within a bivariate framework (Dawson et al., 2007). However, it is also 
possible to model count data using discrete choice methods (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) and such 
methods have previously been adopted by Dawson and Dobson (2010) and Dawson (2012). 
Given the distribution of disciplinary sanctions, we believe it is both appropriate and sensible to 
adopt a discrete choice framework. Specifically, we utilise a generalised bivariate ordered 
response framework for the composite measure and yellow card offences and a generalised 
bivariate binary response framework for red cards and penalty tries, given their relative 
infrequency. 
The generalised bivariate ordinal / binary regression model is: 
*
hY  = Xh + uh  [1] 
*
aY  = Xa + ua  [2] 
Where Y*h and Ya*
 
are latent variables associated with the home and away team, respectively, X 
are row vectors of explanatory variables and uh and ua are unobserved residuals that may be 
stochastically dependent and non-normally distributed. For the various specifications of the 
dependent variable being estimated, the latent variables are constructed according to the criteria 
as set out in Table 2.  
Table 2 near here. 
A number of important explanatory variables are included in the analysis. Table 3 
contains their description and descriptive statistics. To assess the impact of the television match 
official, dummy variables scored one (and otherwise zero) are included for matches in which a 
television match official was operational and for matches when the role of the television match 
official was extended.  
Table 3 near here. 
Other confounding influences are controlled for as identified in the literature. Differences 
in team quality may affect the number of offences committed as a weaker team may commit 
more infringements and therefore be issued with a higher number of sanctionable offences 
(Madrigal & James, 1999). To capture relative team quality, the ranking points system which 
was used to seed the ERC pool draw from 2007/08 onwards is used. Teams received four points 
for finishing top of their ERC group, three points for second and so on. They received further 
points depending on how far they progressed in the knock-out stages with a maximum of 11 
points for the winning team. Teams participating in a subsidiary competition, the European 
Challenge Cup, were also awarded ranking points for reaching the knockout stages of that 
competition. The ERC rankings were determined by the cumulative total ranking points earned 
by each team over the previous four seasons. In this paper ranking points for each team for each 
season from the inception of the ERC in 1995/96 onwards were estimated using the ERC ranking 
points system. Rather than using cumulative ranking points over the previous four years, a 
weighted-points total for each team over the previous four years with the weights declining with 
time was estimated. The ranking points for each team for season t is (pit-1 + .75pit-2 +.5pit-3 
+.25pit-4) where pi is the number of ranking points. Teams were then ranked into four groups 
based on the estimate of ranking points for each team. The highest ranked teams were given a 
ranking of 1 the next ranked teams were ranked 2 and so on. Thus, the model includes a variable 
which measures the difference in ranking as a measure of differences in team quality where the 
rankings range from 1 to 4. 
As well as variables relating to the television match official and relative team quality 
variables relating to match attendance and ground capacity are included. As noted previously, 
the role of the crowd is a well-established determinant of the social pressure on the match 
officials and players leading to home advantage. 
The nationality of the participating teams and the referee for each match along with the 
number of matches in the competition in which the referee previously officiated, which is used 
as a proxy for referee experience, are also included. For example, a more experienced referee 
might be less susceptible to crowd influence. Dawson (2012), for example, found a reduction in 
the number of disciplinary sanctions issued with respect to football referees with more experience 
officiating in European club cup competitions.  
Other match-based characteristics that are included as confounding effects relate to the 
game number of the group stage, if the teams playing are still able to qualify, have qualified or 
can no longer qualify for the knock-out phase, and whether the contest takes place in the evening 
are included. Finally, a variable relating to the introduction of the bonus point to see whether the 
more attacking play this was designed to encourage also increased the number of offences 
committed.  
4. Results and discussion 
The empirical results presented and discussed reflect analysis based on two main themes 
derived from the construction of the dependent variable; the composite incident of sanctions and 
the separate analysis of yellow and red cards, and the awarding of penalty tries. In all cases the 
model estimated error term is assumed to be distributed according to a Clayton copula function. 4 
In all models the null hypothesis of equal coefficients, H0: h a, which is tested on the basis 
of a Wald test, can be rejected, showing that the models have an overall statistical relevance. 
Table 4 reports results for Models 1 and 2 in which a composite measure that combines 
all three types of offences is considered. In Model 3 attention is restricted to a composite measure 
of sanction based only on the incidence of yellow and red cards. 
Table 4 near here. 
Model 1 includes all the explanatory variables other than team nationality and referee 
nationality. The main findings are that there are positive and statistically significant effects 
associated with the introduction of the television match official for the away team (but only at 
the 10% level of significance). No effect however is found following the extended role of the 
television match official. There are (at least) two possible interpretations of this. First, and despite 
initially only adjudicating on the awarding of a try, the television match official acts as 
monitoring device, implicitly making the on-field referee more vigilant to acts of foul play. 
Alternatively, it could be that acceptance of aggressive, and strategic behaviour of players has 
generally increased over time. 
Referee appearances, which proxy referee experience, are also an important determinant. 
It is shown that more experienced referees issue fewer sanctions compared to less experienced 
officials, a finding that is consistent with Dawson (2012). The effect size is similar across both 
                                              
4 Other copula models were also considered (e.g. Gaussian, Frank, Gumbel and Joe) but the 
Clayton provided the best fit according to the likelihood function. 
 
home and away teams5. 
There is also evidence that social pressure, in the form of the crowd, matters. For home 
teams, fuller stadia result in more sanctions issued to the home team whereas it is the absolute 
size of the crowd which appears to increase the number of sanctions issued to the away team. 
Fuller stadia could suggest more balanced crowd influences as suggested by Pollard (1986) and 
Clarke and Norman (1995) and Downward and Jones (2007). 
Relative team quality is also important, affecting the home team negatively (decreasing 
the number of offences) and the away team positively (increasing the number of offences) as 
indicated in the literature (Madrigal & James, 1999). In the case of the away team, this is 
consistent with the view that weaker teams commit more offences. The negative sign associated 
with the home team is unexpected and could relate to implicit bias of officials seeking to 
compensate for lower quality, but the effect is only marginally significant. Finally, the round 
number of the group stage of the competition is associated with an increase in offences. This 
makes sense since matches towards the end of the group stage are potentially more important in 
determining the final group standings and are likely to be more fiercely contested as with playoffs 
(Longley & Lacey, 2012). 
The main results associated with the television match official and referee experience hold 
up with the inclusion of team nationality and referee nationality variables being added in Model 
2 and the results also show that the size of attendances increases the number of offences by both 
                                              
5 To mitigate against possible selection effects a series of robustness checks were performed in 
relation to referee experience. This included robustness checks by restricting the sample to 
referees to similar levels of experience as well as interacting referee experience with the 
television match official dummies. These robustness checks (which are available from the 
corresponding author on request) do not change the main findings reported here. 
the home and away team. This could also be linked to the later stages of competition and 
increased rivalry and fan interest. There is also evidence that the interaction of attendance size 
and the rank of the team reduce the number of sanctions issued to the home team. In contrast to 
Model 1, the relative team quality measure is no longer significant. This is likely to be a result 
of the correlation between relative team quality and team nationality effects. 
When the composite measure is restricted to yellow and red cards (Model 3) similar 
results to those presented in Model 2 are found, but here the extended role of the television match 
official is now significant. The season time trend also implies that offences committed have fallen 
over time, but the effect is only significant for the away team. Given the construction of the 
dependent variable in this model, the number of penalty tries awarded to the home and away 
team can be added as additional explanatory variables. As perhaps expected, matches in which a 
penalty try is awarded to the home team are also associated with higher levels of yellow and red 
cards issued to the away team. In a similar manner, higher levels of yellow and red cards issued 
to home teams tend to coincide with penalty tries awarded to away teams. 
The second set of the empirical results considers the award of yellow cards, red cards and 
penalty tries separately, with the results reported in Table 5. The results associated with the 
consideration of just yellow card offences (Model 4) is in line with the results of the 
corresponding model that combine yellow and red cards (Model 3). This is to be expected since, 
as noted earlier, the distribution of yellow cards has much the highest frequency of all offence 
types considered. 
Table 5 near here. 
In the case of red cards alone (Model 5) there is evidence that the extended role of the 
television match official has led to a decrease in the probability of a red card being issued to the 
home team but no evidence that the probability of a red card being issued changed with the 
television match official’s initial introduction. Here no effect at all for red card offences 
committed by the away team is identified. There is also no evidence to suggest that referee 
experience matters. Strong evidence is, however, found that red cards often precede or are 
followed by yellow cards and/or penalty tries especially against away teams. It is in this 
specification that the strongest effect statistically in relation to home teams already qualified is 
observed. A significant reduction in sanctions is observed for both the home and away team. In 
a similar manner, when the away team cannot qualify, there is a similar reduction in the number 
of offences committed by the home team. Interestingly in circumstances in which the away team 
has already qualified, increases in offences are observed for both the home team and away team. 
An increase in the probability of red cards awarded to home teams is also observed. 
Finally, in Model 6 attention focuses on penalty tries. In this specification no evidence of 
a television match official effect is found although there is evidence that more experienced 
referees are less likely to award penalty tries to the home team and the combination of attendance 
and rank now has a negative impact on penalty tries awarded to the away team. As in Model 5, 
similar effects are associated with the perceived intensity of the match (with respect to the home 
team having already qualified). In a similar manner, penalty tries often follow or are preceded by 
the award of yellow and red cards. The probability of a penalty try awarded to the home team is 
positively and statistically significantly related to a yellow or red card issued to the away team 
and are less likely to be awarded a penalty try when they have a player sent-off. For the away 
team only matches where one or more yellow cards has been issued to the home team increase 
the probability of a penalty try being awarded. 
4.1 Implications and future research 
The main finding and the key contribution of the paper is that the presence of additional 
monitoring through the use of the television match official, both when it was first introduced and 
when the role was expanded, has had an influence on the issuing of yellow and red cards and in 
the awarding of penalty tries to the home and away teams. To the extent that the adoption of the 
television match official has increased the number of yellow cards awarded to the away team this 
implies that home advantage has increased since its introduction. This suggests that there have 
been unintended consequences associated with its adoption. It appears that referees might have 
been trying to counter home advantage bias without the television match official. This is evidence 
of ‘game management’ in which officials engage in discretionary and perceived desirable 
application of the laws of the game with referees making judgements based on the context of the 
game (MacMahon & Mildenhall, 2012). The above analysis suggests that, in the absence of the 
television match official, officials informally countered home advantage but then adjusted their 
behaviour with the additional monitoring. Whether this was conscious or unconscious cannot be 
established from the data, but clearly merits further investigation. 
There are a number of implications of these findings for sport management. The first is 
that they further demonstrate the usefulness of the Principal-Agent theoretical model to 
understanding game management in sporting contexts. As identified earlier in the literature, the 
effects of additional monitoring in a Principal-Agency context are predicted to vary depending 
on the implementation of the monitoring and the purpose to which it is put. The results in this 
paper confirm this and suggest that there is not a simple necessary outcome of improved balance 
in decision making following the adoption of technology, as perhaps suggested by Downward 
and Jones (2007) and has been found to be the case empirically by Shivakumar (2018).  
The second and related implication is that the implementation of additional technological 
monitoring in sport highlights that the nature of sport is, in general, a context laden activity and 
needs to be managed as such. Specifically in the context of official decision making adding 
additional monitoring, as Collins (2010) argues, challenges the ontological authority, of the 
official, with match outcomes potentially becoming dependent on the form of monitoring of a 
game. In this sense the nature of the sports product changes. It follows that the potential 
interrelationships between the competitors and officials has to be considered fully before making 
changes to monitoring mechanisms in order to avoid unintended consequences. As noted earlier, 
though debated, the impact of yellow cards in rugby can be profound. High profile officials such 
as Nigel Owens identify that between 7 and 10 points can be conceded during the period of a 
yellow card (BBC, 2017). At the same time winning margins have been noted to be in the region 
of 11 points in both the northern and southern hemispheres (Premiership Rugby, 2013; Talking 
Rugby Union, 2013). It follows that the impact of yellow cards, that is one decision of the official, 
can be decisive in determining match results.  
The third implication is that to reduce the variance of outcomes through bias, the same 
monitoring approach should be adopted for all matches in a competition. This is particularly 
important in the context of rugby because currently not all matches have a television match 
official in some competitions and the same referee may be involved across these matches. 
Generally, it is clear that the management of officials needs to be adapted to ensure that officials 
recognise how the television match official may affect their decision making and, of course, 
mechanisms for reducing this influence need to be established.  
A number of implications also arise specifically for the specific management of rugby. 
Critics have argued that the use of the television match official has added significantly to the 
duration of rugby matches (The Economist, 2015). In one high profile ERCC match in 2017/18 
the television match official review took 6 minutes and 40 seconds before a decision was reached 
(Thornley, 2018) while World Rugby subsequently announced that the television match official 
had erred by failing to award a try in the 2018 Six Nations Championship match between England 
and Wales (Rees, 2018). Issues have also been raised about control over replays with suggestions 
that broadcasters may not provide images to television match officials that might prove 
unfavourable to the home team (Thornley, 2018). If correct this could also partly explain the 
findings that the television match official has increased the number of yellow cards awarded to 
away teams. If this is the case this clearly needs correction. However, this would increase the 
cost of the television match official to the sport and independent control over images from the 
broadcasters would be needed. More generally, these discussions recognise that it is not clear to 
stakeholders that the role of the television match official is neutral on decision making and 
therefore necessarily advantageous to the sport.  
Consequently, further adjustments to the role of the television match official are taking 
place. Super Rugby amended its television match official rules in 2017 limiting television match 
official interventions to cases involving blatant errors by the on-field referee (Radio New 
Zealand, 2017). Finally, The Economist (2015) argued that television match officials should be 
located away from the ground, as Downward and Jones (2007) suggested, rather than in outside 
broadcast vehicles in the stadium, where crowd influences may persist. Further scrutiny of the 
role and impact of television match officials is thus important by governing bodies to remove the 
risks of outcomes being potentially determined through biases. 
A number of avenues for future research are also raised by the paper and could be 
addressed if other data permit their investigation. Clearly, underlying team performance and 
strategy is the possibility that teams do not always field their strongest sides whilst playing away 
from home, or they lose motivation, which has been noted in rugby (Julian, 2017; Ray, 2018). It 
follows that future research could attempt to match teams and their squads as closely as possible 
in seeking to control for such confounding effects, that simple controls for previous form of 
teams do not capture. A further issue is that yellow cards, or other sanction, can have different 
effects at different times of the game. To lose a player for the majority of a game to a red card is 
likely to condemn a side to certain defeat. In contrast for a team to lose a player to a yellow card, 
with two minutes to play may not affect the result, assuming that this is not in a situation in which 
the yellow card went to a defending side under duress close to the try line and the scores are very 
close. Timing has been shown to matter in official sanction in football (Buraimo et al., 2010).    
4.2 Conclusion 
Whilst a lack of bias in sporting competition has always been viewed as desirable in sport, 
it is well known that home advantage applies to many sports. Through the influence of crowds, 
match officials are identified as a key source of the mediation of home bias as crowds, amongst 
other factors such as nationality, familiarity with teams and players can influence the subjective 
judgement and potential preferences of officials. In the context of a Principal-Agency Problem, 
in which officials are imperfectly monitored by sports organisers, this has prompted the use of 
the television match official to help to remove subjective judgement. Based on an analysis of the 
award of sanctionable offences in matches played in the group stages of the European Rugby 
Cup (ERC) and European Rugby Champions Cup (ERCC) over 15 seasons from 2000/01 to 
2015/16, the key finding of this paper is that the use of the television match official has increased 
the number of yellow cards awarded to away teams, increasing home bias and suggesting that 
referees may have been consciously or unconsciously seeking to avoid contributing to home bias 
before the introduction of the television match official. Recognising that such an adjustment 
takes place according to the circumstances of the match is important information for the 
management and planning of the monitoring of sports officials. Only through a clearer 
understanding of how third-party scrutiny influences decisions can officials receive the relevant 
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Table 1 
Mean Number of Yellow and Red Cards and Penalty Tries before and after the 
introduction of TMO and extended role of TMO 
                                    TMO TMO Ext 
Offence Before Aftera  
Yellow card: Home 0.389 [0.075] 0.408 [0.021] 0.438 [0.051] 
Yellow Card: Away 0.514 [0.093] 0.659 [0.027] 0.646 [0.054] 
Red Card: Home 0.014 [0.014] 0.015 [0.004] 0.010 [0.007] 
Red Card: Away 0.028 [0.020] 0.025 [0.005] 0.021 [0.010] 
Penalty Try: Home 0.056 [0.027] 0.062 [0.009] 0.109 [0.028] 
Penalty Try: Away 0.014 [0.014] 0.037 [0.007] 0.057 [0.017] 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses.  
a Period after the introduction of the TMO but before the extended role of the TMO. 
 
Table 2 
Construction of the Latent Dependent Variable 
Composite Measures and Yellow Cards   Red Cards and Penalty Tries  
Yh Ya  Yh Ya 
0 if 𝑌ℎ
∗ = 0  0 if 𝑌𝑎
∗ = 0  0 if 𝑌ℎ
∗ = 0 0 if 𝑌𝑎




∗ = 1 
 
1 if 𝑌𝑎
∗ = 1 
 
 1 if 𝑌ℎ
∗ ≥ 1 
 
1 if 𝑌𝑎
∗ ≥ 1 
 
2 if 𝑌ℎ
∗ = 2 
 
2 if 𝑌𝑎
∗ = 2 
 
   
3 if 𝑌ℎ




∗ ≥ 3 
 
   
Table 3 
Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition Mean (sd) 
TMOTRY Introduction of television match official (TMO) 
(1=yes; 0=no) 
    0.936 (0.245) 
TMOEXT Extended role of the TMO applies to the match 
(1=yes; 0 =no) 
    0.171 (0.377) 
REFAPPS Number of matches in the competition in which 
the referee previously officiated 
(prior to the current match). 
  17.26 (15.135) 
BONUSPT If team scored a “bonus point” (scoring 4 or 
more tries or losing by 7 points or less)  
(1=yes; 0 =no) 
    0.808 (0.393) 
ECC The ERC was replaced by the ERCC 
 (1=yes; 0 =no) 
    0.107 (0.309) 
CAPREACHED The match sold out the stadium 
(1=yes; 0 =no) 
    0.103 (0.304) 
ATT Match attendance      10,301.25 (7,029.54)    
RANK_DIFF The difference in ranking points (home team 
ranking points minus away team ranking points) 
    0.002 (1.713) 
ATT* 
RANK_DIFF 
Interaction of attendance and rank 
difference 
    3,147.74 (20,165.77) 
CHAMP The team won the ERC or the ERCC in the 
previous season (1=yes; 0 =no) 
0.207 (0.444) 
CANNOTQH The home team can no longer qualify for the 
knockout stage (1=yes; 0 =no) 
0.118 (0.322) 
QH The  home team has already qualified for the 
knockout stage (1=yes; 0 =no) 
0.010 (0.099) 
CANNOTQA The away team can no longer qualify for the 
knockout stage (1=yes; 0 =no) 
0.108 (0.310) 
QA The away team has already qualified for the 
knockout stage (1=yes; 0 =no) 
0.017 (0.129) 
EVENING The match kicked-off after 5pm  
(1=yes; 0 =no) 
0.383 (0.486) 
ROUND Time trend denoting the game number within 








Incidents of Yellow Cards, Red Cards and Penalty Tries - Composite Measures 
 Model 1:  
Yellow cards, red cards & penalty tries 
 Model 2:  
Yellow cards, red cards & penalty tries 
 Model 3: 
Yellow cards & red cards  
Variable Home Team Away Team  Home Team Away Team  Home Team Away Team 
TMOTRY 0.295 (0.187) 0.347* (0.200)  0.308 (0.202) 0.355* (0.199)  0.276 (0.201) 0.396** (0.185) 
TMOEXT 0.0169 (0.174) 0.243 (0.150)  0.0457 (0.184) 0.244* (0.145)  0.0980 (0.185) 0.305** (0.119) 
SEASON -0.0051 (0.016) -0.0213 (0.016)  -0.0096 (0.015) -0.0244 (0.016)  -0.022 (0.016) -0.036** (0.014) 
REFAPPS -0.009*** (0.003) -0.009*** (0.002)  -0.009** (0.004) -0.006*** (0.002)  -0.009*** (0.004) -0.005* (0.003) 
BONUSPT -0.110 (0.154) 0.0913 (0.114)  -0.103 (0.157) 0.122 (0.120)  -0.018 (0.159) 0.164 (0.110) 
ECC 0.258 (0.189) -0.004 (0.165)  0.200 (0.184) -0.0192 (0.176)  0.186 (0.186) -0.127 (0.185) 
CAPREACHED 0.204*** (0.077) 0.0153 (0.169)  0.210**(0.087) -0.0204 (0.155)  0.179** (0.080) -0.018 (0.147) 












RANK_DIFF -0.0791* (0.043) 0.093***(0.035)  -0.0038 (0.039) 0.0394 (0.051)  -0.006 (0.04) 0.045 (0.051) 
ATT* RANK_DIFF -0.00000255 
(0.00000362) 
-0.00000363    
(0.00000283) 
 -0.00000725**  
(0.00000352) 
-0.00000180    
(0.00000312) 
 -0.00000598*    
(0.00000359) 
-0.00000143    
(0.00000315) 
CHAMP -0.134 (0.107) 0.072 (0.120)  -0.097 (0.109) -0.015 (0.120)  -0.087 (0.109) -0.012 (0.127) 
CANNOTQH -0.0527 (0.092) -0.299*** (0.109)  -0.0696 (0.101) -0.283** (0.118)  -0.071 (0.111) -0.258** (0.115) 
QH -0.316 (0.353) -0.607 (0.399)  -0.271 (0.357) -0.727* (0.399)  -0.299 (0.306) -0.69 (0.406) 
CANNOTQA -0.0096 (0.124) 0.005 (0.113)  0.041 (0.130) 0.066 (0.117)  0.140 (0.134) 0.054 (0.124) 
QA 0.264 (0.257) 0.408 (0.317)  0.273 (0.242) 0.402 (0.306)  0.288 (0.221) 0.169 (0.271) 
EVENING 0.0148 (0.086) 0.0087 (0.057)  0.080 (0.088) -0.069 (0.070)  0.112 (0.095) -0.092 (0.067) 
ROUND 0.046**(0.020) 0.091*** (0.022)  0.043** (0.020) 0.088*** (0.023)  0.037 (0.023) 0.064*** (0.021) 
PTHOME       -0.103 (0.101) 0.418*** (0.109) 
PTAWAY       0.548*** (0.181) 0.174 (0.122) 
FIXED EFFECTS No  Yes  Yes 
THETA 0.502*** (0.118)  0.483*** (0.116)  0.459*** (0.114) 
EQUALITY OF 
COEFFICIENTS 
2(df=17) = 101.162  2(df=32) = 766.292  2(df=34) = 549.127 
Notes. n = 1,121. Coefficients from bivariate ordered response frameworks.  Figures in brackets are robust standard 





Incidents of Yellow Cards, Red Cards and Penalty Tries – Separate Treatment 
 Model 4: Yellow Cards  Model 5: Red Cards  Model 6: Penalty Tries 
Variable Home Team Away Team  Home Team Away Team  Home Team Away Team 
TMOTRY 0.213 (0.190) 0.419** (0.184)  0.162 (0.435) -0.057 (0.390)  0.007 (0.408) 0.394 (0.456) 
TMOEXT 0.159 (0.184) 0.324*** (0.110)  -5.308*** (0.746) -0.261 (0.385)  -0.188 (0.371) -0.322 (0.421) 
SEASON -0.023 
(0.016) 
-0.040*** (0.015)  0.032 (0.041) 0.019 (0.042)  0.043 (0.030) 0.075** (0.037) 
REFAPPS -0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.005** (0.002)  -0.004 (0.01) 0.008 (0.006)  -0.014** (0.007) 0.001 (0.006) 
BONUSPT 0.032 (0.164) 0.213** (0.101)  -0.354 (0.366) -0.293 (0.308)  -0.196 (0.256) -0.675*** (0.255) 
ECC 0.153 (0.190) -0.079 (0.180)  5.007*** (0.743) -0.216 (0.477)  0.408 (0.309) 0.302 (0.426) 
CAPREACHED 0.153** 
(0.075) 
-0.007 (0.151)  0.614** (0.257) -0.170 (0.174)  0.015 (0.223)  0.379 (0.340) 
ATT 0.0000115    
(0.00000536) 
0.00000977*    
(0.00000548) 
 -0.000000303  
(0.0000215) 
-0.00000905   
(0.0000159) 






0.061 (0.051)  0.266* (0.161) -0.055 (0.096)  -0.024 (0.072) 0.087 (0.108) 
ATT* RANK_DIFF -0.00000356   
(0.00000303) 
-0.00000280   
(0.00000354) 
 -0.0000287   
(0.0000133) 
0.00000857    
(0.00000638) 






-0.022 (0.127)  0.295 (0.345) 0.108 (0.218)  -0.122 (0.148) 0.080 (0.212) 
CANNOTQH -0.056 
(0.114) 
-0.231* (0.119)  -0.177 (0.555) -0.274 (0.424)  -0.186 (0.192) -0.038 (0.250) 
QH 0.170 (0.233) 0.044 (0.267)  -4.383*** (0.527) -4.314*** (0.252)  -4.819*** (0.317) -3.774*** (0.295) 
CANNOTQA 0.208 (0.140) 0.091 (0.125)  -4.765*** (0.661) -0.405 (0.490)  0.184 (0.170) -5.154*** (0.248) 
QA 0.170 (0.233) 0.044 (0.267)  1.257** (0.526) 0.918* (0.510)  0.550 (0.392) -0.265 (0.442) 
EVENING 0.115 (0.089) -0.125* (0.067)  -0.075 (0.277) 0.181 (0.168)  0.023 (0.144) -0.226 (0.181) 
ROUND 0.039* 
(0.022) 
0.073*** (0.019)  -0.026 (0.045) -0.078 (0.058)  0.126** (0.060) 0.110* (0.059) 
YCHOME    -0.022 (0.111) 0.221 (0.166)  -0.045 (0.078) 0.367*** (0.098) 
YCAWAY    0.015 (0.113) 0.170** (0.077)  0.234*** (0.063) 0.113 (0.081) 
RCHOME -0.042 
(0.226) 
0.206 (0.256)     -4.557*** (0.344) -0.094 (0.415) 
RCAWAY 0.463 (0.313) 0.395** (0.167)     0.774** (0.353) -0.112 (0.500) 
PTHOME -0.077 
(0.107) 
0.357*** (0.119)  -5.131*** (0.689) 0.597** (0.245)    
PTAWAY 0.614*** 
(0.184) 
0.177 (0.149)  0.224 (0.309) -0.0879 (0.319)    
FIXED EFFECTS Yes  Yes  Yes 
THETA 0.461*** (0.117)  0.465* (0.272)  0.117 (0.131) 
EQUALITY OF 
COEFFICIENTS 
2 (df = 36) = 789.064  2 (df = 36) = 6151.905  2 (df = 36) = 4870.295 
Notes. n = 1,121. Coefficients from bivariate ordered response frameworks (Model 4) and bivariate binary response 
framework (Models 5 and 6).  
Figures in brackets are robust standard errors clustered by (home) team. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
